Strict & Absolute Liability (Rylands v. Fletcher & Oleum Gas)

Law of Torts · Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (non-natural user, escape) & 6 exceptions; Absolute Liability in India (M.C. Mehta Oleum Gas leak enterprise liability, Public Liability Insurance Act 1991) · Liability Principles & Capacity

No-fault liability in tort: Strict Liability (Rylands v. Fletcher, 1868) requires dangerous thing, non-natural use, and escape, but admits 5 exceptions. Absolute Liability (M.C. Mehta, 1987) applies to hazardous enterprises with zero exceptions and damages proportional to corporate capacity.

Study notes

Topic at a glance

In the general law of torts, liability is founded on fault (either intentional wrongdoing or negligence). Strict liability and absolute liability are two progressive departures where the law imposes no-fault civil liability: a defendant is held legally answerable for damage caused by hazardous substances or enterprises even in the complete absence of negligence, malice, or intention.

- Strict Liability (The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 1868): Imposes liability for the escape of dangerous things brought onto land during non-natural use, subject to five recognized common law exceptions.

- Absolute Liability (The Indian Innovation in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1987): Formulated by the Supreme Court of India under Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati, this rule holds commercial enterprises engaged in inherently hazardous or dangerous activities liable without any exceptions whatsoever, correlating damages to the financial capacity of the enterprise.

The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868)

In Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, the defendants employed independent contractors (competent engineers) to construct a water reservoir on their land. While excavating, the contractors uncovered old, disused coal shafts filled with earth, which connected secretly to the plaintiff's neighbouring coal mines. The contractors carelessly failed to block these shafts. When the reservoir was filled, the water burst down the shafts and flooded the plaintiff’s mine. The defendants were not personally negligent.

The Court of Exchequer Chamber and the House of Lords affirmed liability.

Blackburn, J. formulated the classic canon of strict liability:

"We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."

Lord Cairns in the House of Lords added the mandatory requirement that the defendant must have put their land to a "non-natural use."

The three essential ingredients of Strict Liability

1. Dangerous Thing: The defendant must bring and collect on their land something likely to cause mischief if it escapes. Examples: large volumes of water, toxic gas, electricity, explosives, noxious fumes, sewage, or wild animals.

2. Non-Natural Use of Land: The use must be extraordinary, special, and accompanied by increased danger to others. Ordinary domestic uses (domestic water supply pipes, ordinary domestic fires, domestic electricity lines) are natural uses and fall outside the rule (Rickards v. Lothian [1913]).

3. Escape: The dangerous substance must escape from a place in the defendant's occupation and control to a place outside their land. If the injury occurs within the defendant’s premises without escape, the rule does not apply (Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd. [1947] — munitions inspector injured inside an explosives factory; no escape, hence strict liability failed).

The five exceptions to Rylands v. Fletcher

Strict liability under English common law is not absolute; it can be defeated by proving one of five affirmative defences:

1. Plaintiff's Own Default: If the damage is caused solely by the plaintiff’s own intrusion or fault (Ponting v. Noakes — plaintiff’s horse reached across boundary fence and ate poisonous yew leaves).

2. Act of God (Vis Major): Extraordinary, unpreventable natural occurrence that human foresight could not anticipate or guard against (Nichols v. Marsland — unprecedented cloudburst burst artificial lakes).

3. Act of a Stranger / Independent Third Party: Sabotage or unauthorized intervention by a third party over whom the defendant had no control, provided the defendant was not negligent (Box v. Jubb; Rickards v. Lothian).

4. Consent of the Plaintiff (Volenti Non Fit Injuria): Where the dangerous thing was maintained with the express or implied consent of the plaintiff, or for the common benefit of both plaintiff and defendant (e.g. water tanks in common tenancy buildings).

5. Statutory Authority: Where a statute expressly authorizes the construction and maintenance of the hazardous undertaking without negligence (Green v. Chelsea Waterworks Co.).

The Indian doctrine of Absolute Liability: M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987)

Following the catastrophic Bhopal Gas Tragedy of December 1984 (where lethal Methyl Isocyanate gas escaped from the Union Carbide plant, killing thousands), the Indian judiciary recognized that the 19th-century English rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, riddled with its five exceptions, was utterly inadequate to protect citizens in a modern industrialized nation.

In December 1985, an escape of Oleum gas occurred from the Shriram Food and Fertilizer plant in Delhi, killing an advocate and hospitalizing hundreds. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case, (1987) 1 SCC 395), decisively broke away from English common law and created an indigenous Indian doctrine:

"We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken... The enterprise must be held strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher."

Crucial departures of Absolute Liability from Strict Liability

1. Zero Exceptions: Absolute liability admits of NO DEFENCES. Neither Act of God, nor third-party sabotage, nor statutory authority can be pleaded. Even if an earthquake or terrorist bombing causes the toxic escape, the enterprise is unconditionally liable.

2. Inherent / Hazardous Enterprise: The doctrine applies specifically to industrial and commercial enterprises operating inherently hazardous or dangerous substances.

3. No Requirement of Escape: The duty is non-delegable; liability extends to workers inside the factory boundary as well as residents living in the surrounding community.

4. Measure of Compensation (Deep-Pocket Principle): Chief Justice Bhagwati laid down an innovative financial principle:

"The measure of compensation in the kind of cases referred to above must be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it."

Legislative and judicial development in India

- Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 584: The Supreme Court applied absolute liability principles to uphold the mass settlement and establish comprehensive rehabilitation funds.

- Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991: Mandates compulsory insurance coverage for all owners handling specified hazardous substances to provide immediate, no-fault interim relief to victims.

- National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (Section 17): Codified the "Polluter Pays" principle and absolute liability for environmental damage caused by accidents.

Procedural & forum anchors (Senior Counsel Reference)

- Competent Forum:

1. Supreme Court under Article 32 or High Courts under Article 226 for violation of Article 21 (Right to Life and a Clean Environment).

2. National Green Tribunal (NGT) under Section 14 and 15 of the NGT Act, 2010 for environmental restoration and victim compensation.

3. Civil Court for full tortious compensation claiming unliquidated damages.

- Limitation Period:

- NGT Claims: Section 14(3) NGT Act allows 5 years from the date cause of action arose (extendable by 60 days on sufficient cause).

- Civil Court: Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 113 (3 years).

- Evidentiary Standard:

- No proof of negligence, lack of care, or mens rea is required.

- The claimant/petitioner must establish only: (a) that the defendant was an enterprise carrying on a hazardous activity, and (b) that an accident/leakage occurred resulting in harm.

- The burden of payment is immediate and unconditional.

Adversarial courtroom submissions

- Claimant / Petitioner Submissions:

1. The respondent enterprise handles inherently dangerous substances posing existential community risk.

2. The occurrence of leakage/damage invokes the non-delegable duty under M.C. Mehta.

3. Deny all common law defences (sabotage, natural calamity, or third-party acts are barred).

4. Pray for punitive/deterrent compensation calibrated to the respondent's gross corporate turnover and balance sheet.

- Respondent / Enterprise Submissions:

1. The substance handled is not "inherently hazardous or dangerous" within the meaning of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

2. The claimant has suffered no proximate physical harm or property impairment.

3. Contest the computation of damages, arguing that compensation should reflect actual pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses under civil restitution rather than arbitrary corporate forfeiture.

Current-law close

In Indian courts, whenever industrial chemical, nuclear, or toxic harm is litigated, bypass the old English Rylands exceptions entirely. Plead the indigenous M.C. Mehta doctrine of Absolute Liability under Article 21 and Section 17 NGT Act, 2010.

Illustrations

Example — Absolute Liability applied

A chemical factory in an industrial corridor stores thousands of litres of toxic phosgene gas. An unexpected seismic tremor causes a storage valve to rupture, allowing toxic clouds to waft into an adjoining residential suburb, causing chronic pulmonary damage to 500 residents. The company argues that an earthquake is an Act of God (Vis Major). Held: In India, under M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, the enterprise is absolutely liable. Act of God is no defence for an inherently hazardous enterprise.

Example — Strict Liability fails (no escape)

A government explosives inspector visits an authorized shell-filling munitions plant to inspect production. While standing inside the filling room, a shell explodes without any proved negligence by the management, injuring the inspector. Held: The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher does not apply because there was no escape of the dangerous thing outside the defendant’s premises into land in other occupation (Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd. [1947]).

Example — Strict Liability exception (Act of God)

A landowner created four artificial ornamental lakes on her country estate by damming a natural stream. A violent, unprecedented rainstorm described as the heaviest in human memory (cloudburst) hit the district, destroying the dams and washing away four county bridges. Held: The defendant proved an Act of God (Vis Major) that could not have been anticipated or guarded against by reasonable human skill. No liability attached under Rylands v. Fletcher (Nichols v. Marsland [1876]).

Problem questions

Classroom & courtroom hypothetical — industrial sabotage vs absolute liability

Apex Agrochem Ltd. operates a large pesticide formulation plant on the outskirts of Vadodara. The plant stores methyl parathion, a classified hazardous toxic organophosphate. A disgruntled ex-employee who was terminated for misconduct sneaks into the facility at night, cuts security fences, and deliberately opens the main drainage discharge valve. Toxic effluent enters a nearby municipal canal, poisoning the drinking water supply of three downstream villages and resulting in the death of livestock and severe hospitalization of 80 villagers. The company demonstrates that it had employed 24-hour armed security, state-of-the-art surveillance, and that the leakage was entirely caused by the criminal sabotage of an independent third-party stranger.

Is Apex Agrochem Ltd. liable to compensate the affected villagers? Can the company successfully plead the defence of "Act of a Stranger" under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher in an Indian court?

Law of Torts in India, the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), and the Constitution Bench judgment in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395.

Under traditional English common law (Rylands v. Fletcher), the "act of a stranger" (third-party sabotage) is a recognized exception to strict liability (Rickards v. Lothian). If English law applied, Apex Agrochem might escape liability by proving that criminal sabotage by an intruder was the sole proximate cause. However, in India, industrial toxic escapes are governed by the doctrine of Absolute Liability established in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India. The Supreme Court explicitly held that an enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry owes a non-delegable duty to the community which admits of NO EXCEPTIONS whatsoever. The enterprise alone reaps commercial profits from the hazardous activity, and it must internalize all risks. Therefore, the defence of "act of a stranger" or third-party sabotage is legally unavailable to an Indian hazardous enterprise. Apex Agrochem is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate every victim, and the quantum of damages will be determined based on the financial magnitude and turnover of the company.

Apex Agrochem Ltd. is absolutely liable to compensate the villagers. Third-party sabotage is no defence under the Indian doctrine of Absolute Liability.

Distinctions

Strict Liability (Rylands) vs Absolute Liability (M.C. Mehta)

  • Jurisprudential Origin: English common law (19th-century pre-industrial England) / Indigenous Indian judicial doctrine (post-Bhopal gas disaster)
  • Exceptions / Defences: Subject to 5 exceptions (Act of God, stranger’s act, plaintiff’s fault, consent, statutory authority) / Subject to NO exceptions whatsoever; unconditional civil liability
  • Scope of Application: Applies to any non-natural use of land bringing dangerous things / Applies specifically to commercial enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities
  • Requirement of Escape: Escape from defendant’s land to outside land is strictly mandatory / Escape is not mandatory; covers workers within factory premises as well as outside community
  • Measure of Damages: Ordinary compensatory unliquidated damages (restitutio in integrum) / Damages scaled to corporate financial capacity (deep-pocket deterrent principle)
  • Strict Liability (Rylands v. Fletcher, 1868)
  • Absolute Liability (M.C. Mehta v. UOI, 1987)

Common misconceptions

Believing that an Act of God or earthquake protects an Indian hazardous factory from paying compensation.

Under M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, an inherently hazardous enterprise cannot plead Act of God, sabotage, or any other exception. Liability is absolute and non-delegable.

Assuming Rylands v. Fletcher applies even when the dangerous thing causes injury inside the defendant’s land.

Under English strict liability, escape outside the defendant’s boundary is an essential ingredient (Read v. Lyons). Without escape, the plaintiff must prove ordinary negligence.

Leading cases

  • Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (House of Lords) — A person who brings and keeps on his land anything likely to do mischief if it escapes is prima facie answerable for all damage that is the natural consequence of its escape, even in the absence of personal negligence.
  • M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case) (1987), (1987) 1 SCC 395 (Supreme Court of India) — Formulated the doctrine of Absolute Liability. Hazardous enterprises owe an absolute, non-delegable duty to the community that is not subject to any exceptions of Rylands v. Fletcher. Compensation is correlated to corporate financial magnitude.
  • Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1991), (1991) 4 SCC 584 (Supreme Court of India) — Upheld the $470 million civil settlement for Bhopal gas victims and affirmed the principle that multi-national enterprises carrying out hazardous operations in developing countries bear strict economic accountability.
  • Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd. (1947), [1947] AC 156 (House of Lords) — Held that where an explosion occurred inside an ordnance factory injuring an inspector, strict liability under Rylands did not apply because there was no escape of the dangerous thing beyond the boundary of the premises.

Questions & answers

Explain the Rule of Strict Liability laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher. What are the essential ingredients of the rule and the exceptions recognized to it?

### 1. Introduction and Formulation of the Rule

The rule of strict liability is an exception to the general principle that civil liability in tort requires fault (intention or negligence). It was formulated in the historic decision of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.

Blackburn, J., in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, delivered the classic statement of the rule:

"The person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."

Lord Cairns in the House of Lords affirmed the decision, adding that the defendant must have put the land to a "non-natural use."

### 2. Essential Ingredients of Strict Liability

To invoke the rule of strict liability, three elements must be established:

#### A. Bringing or Collecting a Dangerous Thing

The defendant must bring and keep on their land something which is likely to do mischief if it escapes (e.g. large reservoirs of water, electricity, gas, noxious chemicals, wild beasts). If the substance was already naturally on the land (e.g. natural rainwater or weeds), the rule does not apply.

#### B. Non-Natural Use of Land

As affirmed by Lord Moulton in Rickards v. Lothian [1913], non-natural use means "some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community." Domestic water piping or household gas supplies are natural users.

#### C. Escape

The dangerous thing must actually escape from a place within the defendant's control and occupation to a place outside it. In Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd. [1947], an inspector was injured by an exploding shell inside the defendant's munitions factory. The House of Lords held that strict liability failed because there was no escape beyond the boundary of the factory.

### 3. Recognized Exceptions to the Rule

Strict liability is not absolute; English common law recognizes five valid defences:

1. Act of God (Vis Major): Extraordinary, unpreventable natural calamity which no human foresight could foresee (Nichols v. Marsland).

2. Plaintiff’s Own Default: Where the escape or damage is caused by the plaintiff’s own intrusion or carelessness (Ponting v. Noakes).

3. Act of a Stranger: Unforeseeable wrongful sabotage by an independent third party over whom the defendant had no control (Box v. Jubb; Rickards v. Lothian).

4. Consent of the Plaintiff (Volenti Non Fit Injuria): Where the dangerous thing was maintained for the common benefit or with the consent of the plaintiff.

5. Statutory Authority: Where an Act of Parliament authorizes the activity without negligence (Green v. Chelsea Waterworks Co.).

### 4. Conclusion

The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher represents a vital stage in the evolution of common law, imposing no-fault liability for hazardous land uses while maintaining balance through recognized equitable exceptions.

Scoring Rubric: Allocate 2 marks for Rylands v. Fletcher facts and Blackburn J.’s canon, 4 marks for the three ingredients (dangerous thing, non-natural use, escape with Read v. Lyons), and 4 marks for the five exceptions with supporting cases.

Trace the transition from the doctrine of Strict Liability to the principle of Absolute Liability in Indian jurisprudence. Critically evaluate M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and discuss how it departed from Rylands v. Fletcher.

### 1. Introduction & Jurisprudential Context

The evolution of civil liability for industrial accidents reflects the common law's continual adaptation to technological expansion. While the 19th-century English rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) introduced "strict liability," it remained shackled by exceptions designed for an agrarian and early industrial economy. The Supreme Court of India, confronted with unprecedented industrial disasters, recognized that applying common law strict liability to modern chemical and nuclear hazards left victims unprotected. Through the pioneering judgment in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987), the Supreme Court evolved the indigenous doctrine of "Absolute Liability."

### 2. The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and Its Inadequacies

Under Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, a person who brings onto land a dangerous thing during non-natural use is answerable for damage caused by its escape. However, the rule was severely weakened by five established exceptions:

1. Act of God (Vis Major)

2. Act of a stranger / third-party sabotage

3. Plaintiff's own default

4. Consent of the plaintiff (common benefit)

5. Statutory authority

In modern mass-disaster litigation, these exceptions enabled corporate defendants to plead sabotage, natural events, or regulatory compliance to avoid civil liability.

### 3. The Catalysts for Change: Bhopal (1984) and Shriram (1985)

- The Bhopal Disaster: In December 1984, the catastrophic leak of Methyl Isocyanate from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal killed over 3,000 citizens immediately and disabled hundreds of thousands. Union Carbide Corporation immediately raised the defence of employee sabotage (act of a stranger) under Rylands v. Fletcher.

- The Oleum Gas Leak: One year later, in December 1985, Oleum gas leaked from Shriram Food & Fertilizer Industries in Delhi, causing death and widespread panic. Public interest litigation under Article 32 was pending before the Supreme Court.

### 4. The Formulation of Absolute Liability in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India

A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati, delivered a path-breaking ruling in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395. The Court explicitly declared:

"We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialized economy... We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England."

#### Key Pillars of Absolute Liability:

1. Enterprise Liability for Inherent Hazards:

The doctrine applies strictly to any enterprise engaged in an inherently dangerous or hazardous industry (e.g. toxic chemicals, gas, explosives, atomic energy).

2. Non-Delegable Duty to the Community:

The enterprise owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to ensure that no harm results to anyone. The permission to conduct hazardous business is conditional upon indemnifying the public against any accident.

3. Complete Elimination of Exceptions (Absolute Character):

The Supreme Court held that liability is NOT subject to any of the exceptions of Rylands v. Fletcher. Act of God, sabotage by a stranger, or statutory approval cannot be pleaded. Liability is unconditional and immediate.

4. Abandonment of the "Escape" Requirement:

Unlike Rylands, which required the substance to cross the property boundary (Read v. Lyons), absolute liability covers victims both inside the plant (workers) and outside (residents).

5. The Deep-Pocket Compensation Formula:

Chief Justice Bhagwati formulated a revolutionary remedial principle:

"The measure of compensation must be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it."

### 5. Legislative and Subsequent Judicial Codification

1. Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991:

Enacted specifically to enforce the philosophy of absolute liability, requiring hazardous industries to take mandatory insurance policies to provide immediate interim relief on a no-fault basis to accident victims.

2. National Green Tribunal Act, 2010:

Section 17 explicitly mandates the application of the "Polluter Pays" principle and absolute liability for environmental damage and human restitution.

3. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (1996):

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that polluters operating toxic chemical plants (sludge dumping in Bichhri village) are absolutely liable to pay for environmental remediation and compensation under Article 21.

### 6. Comparative Critical Evaluation

| Feature | Strict Liability (Rylands) | Absolute Liability (M.C. Mehta) |

|---|---|---|

| Nature of Rule | Common law judicial rule | Constitutional tort doctrine under Article 21 |

| Defences | Five recognized exceptions | Zero exceptions (truly absolute) |

| Target Activity | Any non-natural use of land | Inherently dangerous / hazardous enterprise |

| Escape | Indispensable condition precedent | Not required; covers workers and community |

| Measure of Damages | Compensatory restitution | Compensatory + Deterrent (scaled to corporate capacity) |

### 7. Conclusion

The transition from strict to absolute liability represents one of the greatest contributions of the Indian Supreme Court to global tort jurisprudence. By discarding 19th-century English exceptions and tying compensation to corporate turnover, Indian law established that human life and constitutional dignity under Article 21 supersede corporate commercial profit.

Scoring Rubric: Allocate 4 marks for Rylands v. Fletcher and its inadequacies, 5 marks for the background (Bhopal, Shriram) and the formulation of Absolute Liability in M.C. Mehta, 4 marks for the comparison points and the deep-pocket principle, and 3 marks for statutory developments (PLIA 1991, NGT Act 2010) and conclusion.

Exam tips

  • In exam problems involving toxic gas leaks or chemical factory explosions in India, never apply Rylands v. Fletcher exceptions. Apply M.C. Mehta Absolute Liability directly.
  • Highlight the deep-pocket principle formulated by Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati for comprehensive courtroom submissions.
  • Emphasize that under Indian law, Absolute Liability is rooted in Article 21 constitutional tort jurisprudence.

Revision points

  • Rylands v. Fletcher (1868): Strict liability requires dangerous thing, non-natural use, and escape; subject to 5 exceptions.
  • Exceptions to Rylands: Act of God, plaintiff’s default, act of stranger, common benefit/consent, statutory authority.
  • Read v. Lyons (1947): Strict liability failed because explosion occurred inside factory (no escape).
  • M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987): Established Absolute Liability for hazardous enterprises in India.
  • Absolute Liability has NO exceptions whatsoever; neither Act of God nor stranger’s sabotage can be pleaded.
  • Measure of damages in Absolute Liability: Correlated to corporate financial magnitude (deep-pocket deterrent principle).
  • Legislative codification: Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 and National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (Section 17).

Judgments on this provision

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