Union & State Judiciary

Constitutional Law · SC & HC jurisdiction, appointment, independence

Study notes

## 1. Constitutional Foundation of the Higher Judiciary

The Indian Constitution establishes a unified, integrated judicial system with the Supreme Court of India at the apex (Part V, Chapter IV, Articles 124–147) and the High Courts in the States (Part VI, Chapter V, Articles 214–231). Unlike the dual court system of the United States, India's integrated judiciary enforces both Union and State laws under a single hierarchical appellate and constitutional pyramid.

### The Doctrine of Judicial Independence

Judicial independence is not an individual privilege of the judge, but a structural constitutional guarantee held in trust for the citizenry (*Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India*, 1991). The Constitution entrenches several safeguards:

1. **Security of Tenure:** Article 124(2) guarantees tenure until age 65 (SC) and Article 217(1) until age 62 (HC). Removal is strictly restricted under Article 124(4) and (5) to proven misbehaviour or incapacity, requiring an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership and a majority of not less than two-thirds of members present and voting, preceded by statutory inquiry under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.

2. **Financial Autonomy:** Under Articles 146 and 229, administrative expenses, salaries, allowances, and pensions of judges and court staff are charged directly upon the Consolidated Fund of India or State and are non-votable by Parliament or State Legislatures.

3. **Prohibition of Discussion:** Articles 121 and 211 forbid any discussion in Parliament or State Legislatures regarding the judicial conduct of a judge of the Supreme Court or High Court, except upon an impeachment motion under Article 124(4).

4. **Contempt Jurisdiction:** Articles 129 and 215 designate the Supreme Court and High Courts as Courts of Record with inherent power to punish for contempt of themselves (*Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat*, 1991).

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## 2. Appointment of Judges & The Collegium Jurisprudence

The constitutional phrase *"after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts... as the President may deem necessary"* in Article 124(2) and Article 217(1) has witnessed an epochal jurisprudential evolution:

1. **First Judges Case (*S.P. Gupta v. Union of India*, 1981):** A 7-judge Constitution Bench held that "consultation" does not mean "concurrence". The President (Executive acting on aid and advice of the Council of Ministers) has primacy; the opinion of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) could be disregarded for cogent reasons.

2. **Second Judges Case (*Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) v. Union of India*, 1993):** A 9-judge Constitution Bench overruled *S.P. Gupta*, establishing that judicial independence is a basic feature of the Constitution. To insulate appointments from political patronage, "consultation" was interpreted to necessitate "concurrence". Primacy was vested in the CJI, who must formulate opinions along with a Collegium of two senior-most puisne judges.

3. **Third Judges Case (*Special Reference No. 1 of 1998*):** In an Article 143 advisory opinion, a 9-judge Bench expanded the Collegium:

- For SC appointments: CJI + 4 senior-most puisne judges.

- For HC appointments: CJI + 2 senior-most puisne judges, with consultation of the Chief Justice and senior judges of the respective High Court.

- Any appointment recommendation made without consulting the full Collegium lacks constitutional legitimacy and is non-binding on the President.

4. **Fourth Judges Case / NJAC Case (*SCAORA v. Union of India*, 2015):** The 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014 sought to replace the Collegium with a 6-member Commission comprising the CJI, two senior SC judges, the Union Law Minister, and two "eminent persons" (with a veto power vested in any two members). A 5-judge Constitution Bench struck down both the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act by a 4:1 majority as unconstitutional, holding that judicial primacy in appointments forms an integral, non-negotiable component of judicial independence, which is an inviolable basic feature of the Constitution.

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## 3. Jurisdictions of the Supreme Court

### A. Original Federal Jurisdiction (Article 131)

- Exclusively determines legal disputes between: (a) Government of India and one or more States; (b) GOI and States on one side and other States on the other; (c) two or more States inter se.

- **Conditions Precedent:** The dispute must involve a legal right (not a purely political question), and the party opposing the Centre or another State must be a constituent unit (State) of the Union, not a private citizen or statutory corporation (*State of Bihar v. Union of India*, 1970).

### B. Appellate Jurisdiction (Articles 132–134)

- **Constitutional Appeals (Art 132):** Appeals lie from any judgment, decree, or final order of a High Court if the High Court certifies under Article 134A that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.

- **Civil Appeals (Art 133):** Substantial question of law of general importance that in HC's opinion requires decision by SC.

- **Criminal Appeals (Art 134):** Inherent right of appeal where HC reverses an acquittal and sentences the accused to death, or sentences him to imprisonment for life / not less than 10 years, or withdraws a trial to itself and sentences to death.

### C. Special Leave Petitions (Article 136)

- **Plenary & Discretionary Power:** The Supreme Court may grant special leave to appeal from *any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal* in the territory of India (except military tribunals under Art 136(2)).

- **Two Stages (*Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala*, 2000):**

1. *Petition stage:* The Court exercises discretionary jurisdiction to grant or refuse leave. Dismissal in limine at this stage does not attract the doctrine of merger.

2. *Appellate stage:* Once leave is granted, the SLP converts into a regular Civil or Criminal Appeal, and the final decision attracts the doctrine of merger.

### D. Law Declared by SC Binding (Article 141)

- The *ratio decidendi* of any Supreme Court judgment is binding law on all courts and tribunals within the territory of India.

- **Obiter Dicta vs Ratio:** Obiter dicta of the Supreme Court carry immense persuasive weight and are binding on lower courts if stated with deliberate intent, but do not override direct statutory provisions.

- **Per Incuriam Exception:** A decision rendered in ignorance of an express statutory provision or a binding judgment of a coordinate or larger bench is *per incuriam* and lacks precedential authority (*State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.*, 1991).

### E. Inherent Powers to do Complete Justice (Article 142)

- Article 142(1) empowers the Supreme Court to pass any decree or order necessary for doing *"complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it"*.

- **Limits of Art 142 (*Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India*, 1998):** Article 142 cannot be used to bypass express statutory prohibitions or supplant substantive legislative provisions. It supplements, rather than supplants, existing law.

### F. Advisory Jurisdiction (Article 143)

- The President may refer questions of law or fact of public importance to the Supreme Court for its opinion.

- **Art 143(1):** Matters of public importance; SC *may* decline to answer if reasons exist (e.g., *Ayodhya Reference (Ismail Faruqui)*, 1994).

- **Art 143(2):** Pre-constitutional treaties, agreements, or covenants; SC is *obligated* to deliver an opinion.

- **Precedential Value:** Advisory opinions delivered under Article 143 are not judgments binding under Article 141, but carry the highest persuasive authority (*In re Special Courts Bill*, 1978).

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## 4. High Courts: Articles 226 & 227

- **Article 226:** High Courts have power to issue directions, orders, or writs (habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari) for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights **and for any other purpose** (legal rights).

- **Article 227 (Power of Superintendence):**

- High Courts exercise judicial and administrative superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout their territorial jurisdiction (*Waryam Singh v. Amarnath*, 1954).

- Unlike appellate review, Article 227 is exercised sparingly to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority, correcting patent jurisdictional errors or perverse findings (*Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath*, 2015).

- **Basic Structure (*L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India*, 1997):** Judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 is an inviolable basic structure feature. Parliament cannot by constitutional amendment (such as Art 323A/323B tribunals) exclude the High Courts' supervisory jurisdiction. Tribunals act as courts of first instance, but their decisions remain subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court under Article 226/227.

Evidence and litigation anchor

For constitutional challenges involving disputed factual predicates, counsel should identify the burden of proof under Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 sections 104–106, apply section 109 only where the relevant fact is especially within a person's knowledge, and address electronic records under section 63 where applicable. These provisions support proof of facts; they do not alter the constitutional standard of review.

Constitutional Safeguards for Judicial Independence

Articles 124, 146, 217, 229 establish structural independence: tenure security, removal only by special majority parliamentary impeachment under the Judges (Inquiry) Act 1968, non-votable Consolidated Fund expenditure, and absolute immunity from legislative debate (Arts 121 & 211).

Judicial independence and judicial review are basic structure features that cannot be abridged or abrogated by Parliament even by constitutional amendment (Kesavananda Bharati; L. Chandra Kumar; NJAC Case).

Collegium Evolution & The Fourth Judges Case (NJAC)

Evolution through the Judges Cases: First Judges Case (1981 - executive primacy), Second Judges Case (1993 - judicial primacy via CJI + 2), Third Judges Case (1998 - CJI + 4 for SC, CJI + 2 for HC).

The 99th Amendment and NJAC Act, 2014 were invalidated in SCAORA (2015) because an executive or non-judicial veto over judicial appointments impairs independence of the judiciary, which is an unalterable basic structure component.

Supreme Court Jurisdictions: Arts 131, 136, 141, 142 & 143

Article 131 original jurisdiction is reserved strictly for federal disputes between Centre and States or States inter se involving legal rights.

Article 136 vests extraordinary, discretionary plenary power to grant special leave against any judicial/tribunal decree in India.

Article 141 commands that law declared by SC is binding across all Indian courts. Decisions per incuriam do not form binding precedents.

Article 142 empowers SC to fashion equitable remedies to do complete justice, without overriding substantive statutory mandates.

Article 143 advisory jurisdiction provides presidential references on questions of law or public importance.

High Court Supervisory and Writ Powers: Arts 226 & 227

Article 226 is broader in scope than Article 32 because it enforces both Fundamental Rights and statutory/legal rights ("for any other purpose").

Article 227 confers inherent judicial superintendence over all subordinate courts and tribunals to prevent grave dereliction of duty or jurisdictional excess.

Statutory provisions

  • Constitution of India — Art. Article 124 — Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court
  • Constitution of India — Art. Article 129 — Supreme Court to be a court of record
  • Constitution of India — Art. Article 131 — Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
  • Constitution of India — Art. Article 136 — Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
  • Constitution of India — Art. Article 141 — Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts
  • Constitution of India — Art. Article 142 — Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc.
  • Constitution of India — Art. Article 143 — Power of President to consult Supreme Court
  • Constitution of India — Art. Article 214 — High Courts for States
  • Constitution of India — Art. Article 226 — Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
  • Constitution of India — Art. Article 227 — Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court

Illustrations

Article 136: Dismissal in Limine vs Dismissal on Merits (Doctrine of Merger)

An SLP against a High Court judgment is dismissed by the Supreme Court with a one-word order: "Dismissed". Under Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000), no leave was granted; the appellate jurisdiction of the SC was not triggered, and the doctrine of merger does not apply. The High Court judgment remains operative, and the aggrieved party may still file a review petition before the High Court. Conversely, if the SC granted leave and subsequently dismissed the appeal on merits, the HC judgment merges into the SC decree, extinguishing HC review jurisdiction.

Article 142 Power vs Express Statutory Enactments

In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998), the Supreme Court held that while exercising contempt jurisdiction or Article 142 powers, the Court cannot suspend an advocate's license to practice law, because the Advocates Act, 1961 vests professional disciplinary jurisdiction exclusively in the State Bar Councils and Bar Council of India. Article 142 cannot circumvent or nullify explicit statutory frameworks.

Problem questions

The Federal Inter-State Water and Boundary Dispute

State Alpha files an original civil suit in the Supreme Court under Article 131 against the Union of India and a statutory public sector corporation (National River Project Corporation Ltd.) challenging the allocation of irrigation waters and asserting violation of an inter-State agreement. The Union of India files an application questioning the maintainability of the suit under Article 131 on two grounds: (1) a statutory corporation is joined as a defendant, and (2) water disputes are barred by Article 262 and the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956. Examine the maintainability.

1. Addition of Private / Corporate Parties: Under State of Bihar v. Union of India (1970), Article 131 is strictly confined to disputes between the Union and States or States inter se. A statutory corporation or government company, even if wholly owned by the State, is not a "State" for the purposes of Article 131; its joinder as a necessary party invalidates an Art 131 suit. 2. Statutory Exclusion under Article 262: Article 262(2) expressly allows Parliament to enact laws barring the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and any other court over inter-State river disputes. Section 11 of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 bars all courts from adjudicating disputes referable to a Water Tribunal. Therefore, the suit under Article 131 is wholly non-maintainable on both jurisdictional grounds.

Distinctions

  • Art 32 is itself a Fundamental Right guaranteed in Part III; the SC cannot arbitrarily refuse to entertain an Art 32 petition where a FR is violated.
  • Art 226 is a constitutional power, not a Part III Fundamental Right, though it cannot be withheld where fundamental rights are infringed.
  • Art 32 can only be invoked for the enforcement of Part III Fundamental Rights; Art 226 can be invoked for FRs AND "for any other purpose" (statutory/legal rights).
  • SC has nationwide territorial jurisdiction under Art 32; HC jurisdiction under Art 226 is restricted to its territorial limits or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises (Art 226(2)).
  • Article 32 Writ Jurisdiction (SC)
  • Article 226 Writ Jurisdiction (HC)
  • Art 226 is primarily directed against administrative authorities, statutory bodies, tribunals, and inferior courts to quash acts, grant writs, or enforce rights.
  • Art 227 is supervisory jurisdiction directed exclusively over subordinate courts and judicial/quasi-judicial tribunals within the High Court's territory.
  • Art 226 exercises original constitutional jurisdiction; Art 227 exercises supervisory visitorial jurisdiction.
  • Under Art 227, the High Court ensures that subordinate courts act within the bounds of their jurisdiction; it does not sit as a court of appeal to re-appreciate evidence (Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath).
  • Article 226 (Writ Review)
  • Article 227 (Superintendence)

Common misconceptions

The Supreme Court is obligated to answer any question referred to it by the President under Article 143.

Under Article 143(1), the Supreme Court retains judicial discretion and may refuse to answer a reference if the question is academic, politically fraught, or incapable of judicial resolution (e.g., Ayodhya Reference 1994). Only under Article 143(2) (pre-constitutional treaties) is the Court bound to give an opinion.

A dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) in limine by the Supreme Court creates binding precedent under Article 141 on the legal points involved.

A summary dismissal of an SLP at the threshold without reasons under Art 136 means only that the Court declined to exercise discretionary appellate jurisdiction. It does not affirm the merits of the High Court's legal rationale, does not attract the doctrine of merger, and does not constitute binding precedent under Article 141 (Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, 2000).

Leading cases

  • Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) v. Union of India (Second Judges Case) (1993), (1993) 4 SCC 441 — Judicial independence is a basic feature of the Constitution; "consultation" under Articles 124(2) and 217(1) means "concurrence", establishing the primacy of the CJI and senior puisne judges in appointments.
  • Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 (Third Judges Case) (1998), (1998) 7 SCC 739 — Crystallized the Collegium: CJI + 4 senior-most judges for Supreme Court appointments; CJI + 2 senior-most judges for High Court appointments.
  • Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (NJAC Case / Fourth Judges Case) (2015), (2015) 6 SCC 1 — Struck down the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the NJAC Act as unconstitutional; held that judicial primacy in appointments forms an integral part of judicial independence and the basic structure.
  • L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), (1997) 3 SCC 261 — Judicial review under Articles 32 and 226/227 is an inviolable basic structure feature; statutory tribunals cannot bypass or exclude High Court supervisory review under Article 226/227.
  • Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000), (2000) 6 SCC 359 — Laid down the doctrine of merger: dismissal of an SLP in limine does not attract the doctrine of merger, leaving the High Court order open to review, whereas disposal after leave merges the order into the Supreme Court decree.
  • Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998), (1998) 4 SCC 409 — Article 142 powers cannot be used to bypass express statutory provisions or supplant substantive legislative codes like the Advocates Act 1961.

Questions & answers

Examine the scope, plenary character, and limitations of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. Distinguish between dismissal of an SLP in limine and disposal of an appeal after grant of leave.

### 1. Synopsis / Introduction

Article 136 of the Constitution of India confers extraordinary appellate jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court by vesting it with the plenary discretion to grant special leave to appeal against any judgment, decree, determination, sentence, or order in any cause or matter passed by any court or tribunal in India (excluding Armed Forces tribunals under Art 136(2)). It is a residual constitutional power reserved to correct grave miscarriages of justice.

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### 2. Nature and Plenary Scope of Article 136

1. **Sweeping Language:** The power under Article 136 is not circumscribed by the ordinary restrictions of statutory appeals (such as monetary limits or substantial questions of law). It applies to civil, criminal, constitutional, tax, labour, and commercial determinations (*Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT*, 1954).

2. **Tribunals Included:** The word "tribunal" under Article 136 encompasses quasi-judicial authorities performing inherent sovereign judicial functions of the State, such as the NCLAT, SAT, and Central Administrative Tribunal (*Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees*, 1950).

3. **Discretionary Character:** Article 136 does not confer a fundamental or statutory right of appeal on any litigant; it merely vests an untrammelled discretion in the Supreme Court to intervene where grave injustice has occurred (*Pritam Singh v. State*, 1950).

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### 3. Judicial Limitations on the Exercise of Article 136

The Supreme Court has consistently held that Article 136 is an exceptional reserve power to be exercised sparingly and with utmost caution:

- **No Routine Second Appeal:** The Court will not sit as a regular appellate court to re-appreciate concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower courts, unless the finding is perverse or based on inadmissible evidence (*State of Punjab v. Hari Singh*, 1974).

- **Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies:** Unless exceptional or urgent circumstances exist, the Supreme Court requires the petitioner to exhaust remedies before the High Court under Article 226/227.

- **Clean Hands:** A litigant suppressing material facts or playing fraud on the court will be summarily non-suited under Article 136 without consideration of legal merits.

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### 4. Dismissal in Limine vs Disposal on Merits: The Doctrine of Merger

In the landmark decision of *Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala* (2000) 6 SCC 359, a three-judge Bench clarified the two distinct stages of Article 136 and the application of the Doctrine of Merger:

| Parameter | Dismissal of SLP in Limine (Stage 1) | Disposal of Appeal After Leave Granted (Stage 2) |

| :--- | :--- | :--- |

| **Status of Proceeding** | Court only decides whether to exercise discretion to grant leave. | Leave is granted; the SLP converts into a regular Civil/Criminal Appeal. |

| **Doctrine of Merger** | **Does not apply.** The High Court order remains intact and does not merge into the SC dismissal. | **Applies.** The High Court order merges into the decree/order of the Supreme Court. |

| **Precedent under Art 141** | A non-speaking dismissal creates **no binding precedent** on any question of law. | The decision operates as binding precedent under Article 141 on questions of law decided. |

| **Remedy before High Court** | The petitioner **can still file a Review Petition** before the High Court against its judgment. | High Court review is completely barred because the order has merged into the Supreme Court decree. |

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### 5. Conclusion

Article 136 is the constitutional safety valve of the Indian judicial system. It does not transform the Supreme Court into a court of routine error correction, but preserves an ultimate institutional avenue to prevent systemic injustice, governed by the disciplined doctrine of merger articulated in *Kunhayammed*.

"The independence of the judiciary is a cardinal feature of the basic structure of the Constitution, and judicial primacy in appointments is its indispensable corollary." Trace the jurisprudential evolution of the Collegium system through the Judges Cases, critique the invalidation of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), and examine the dynamic interaction between Article 141, Article 142, and the separation of powers.

### 1. Introduction: Constitutional Anchor & The Doctrine of Separation of Powers

In the constitutional democracy established by the Republic of India, the separation of powers between the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary is an essential pillar of constitutional governance. While the Indian Constitution does not adopt a rigid institutional separation like the American Constitution, it mandates functional separation (Article 50). In *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala* (1973) and *Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain* (1975), the Supreme Court ruled that both **judicial independence** and **judicial review** form non-negotiable, inviolable components of the basic structure of the Constitution. The mechanism of appointing judges to the higher judiciary (Articles 124(2) and 217(1)) forms the structural gateway through which judicial independence is maintained or compromised.

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### 2. The Great Semantic Battle: "Consultation" vs "Concurrence"

Articles 124(2) and 217(1) mandate that appointments to the Supreme Court and High Courts shall be made by the President *"after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts... as the President may deem necessary"*. The definition of "consultation" has traversed four distinct phases:

#### A. First Judges Case: *S.P. Gupta v. Union of India* (1981 Supp SCC 87)

- A 7-judge Constitution Bench held that "consultation" does not mean "concurrence".

- The Bench ruled that the Central Executive holds ultimate primacy in judicial appointments, reflecting the democratic accountability of the elected executive. The opinion of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) could be disregarded for cogent and relevant reasons. This era saw increased executive dominance and transfers of inconvenient judges.

#### B. Second Judges Case: *SCAORA v. Union of India* (1993) 4 SCC 441

- A 9-judge Constitution Bench overruled *S.P. Gupta* by a 7:2 majority.

- The Court held that judicial independence is a basic feature of the Constitution. To protect the higher judiciary from political patronage and executive encroachment, "consultation" was re-interpreted to necessitate **concurrence**.

- **Primacy of the CJI:** The opinion of the CJI represents the collective wisdom of the judiciary and holds determinative primacy. The Court mandated that the CJI must consult the two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court before making recommendations.

#### C. Third Judges Case: *Special Reference No. 1 of 1998* (1998) 7 SCC 739

- On a Presidential reference under Article 143, a 9-judge Bench affirmed the Second Judges Case and formally crystallized the modern Collegium architecture:

- **Supreme Court Appointments:** The CJI must act in consultation with a Collegium comprising the **four senior-most puisne judges** of the Supreme Court.

- **High Court Appointments:** The Collegium consists of the CJI and the **two senior-most puisne judges**, alongside consultation with the respective High Court Chief Justice.

- **Plurality of Voices:** If a majority of the Collegium opposes a candidate, the CJI cannot forward the recommendation. A recommendation sent without following the Collegium consultative norm is unconstitutional and non-binding on the President.

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### 3. The 99th Constitutional Amendment and the Fourth Judges Case (NJAC)

To remedy criticisms of opacity, lack of accountability, and judicial self-appointment inherent in the Collegium system, Parliament unanimously passed the **Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014** and the **National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014**, creating a six-member Commission:

- Chief Justice of India (Chairperson, ex officio)

- Two senior-most Supreme Court Judges

- Union Minister of Law and Justice (ex officio)

- Two "eminent persons" (nominated by a committee of Prime Minister, CJI, and Leader of Opposition)

- Crucially, Section 6(6) of the NJAC Act provided that if any **two members** opposed a recommendation, the Commission could not make the appointment.

#### The Judgment in *SCAORA v. Union of India (Fourth Judges Case)* (2015) 6 SCC 1

A 5-judge Constitution Bench by a 4:1 majority (Khehar, Lokur, Kurian Joseph, and Goel JJ.; Chelameswar J. dissenting) struck down both the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act:

1. **Primacy as Basic Structure:** The majority held that judicial primacy in appointments is an indispensable component of judicial independence, which itself is part of the basic structure.

2. **Executive & Eminent Person Veto:** Under the NJAC composition, the Law Minister together with one eminent person, or two eminent persons, could veto a unanimous recommendation of the three senior-most judges of India. This conceded an executive/layman veto over judicial appointments, fatal to judicial independence.

3. **Dissent of Chelameswar J.:** Justice Chelameswar dissented, noting that the Collegium is an extraconstitutional mechanism absent from the original text, fraught with opacity, nepotism, and lack of institutional accountability, and that the NJAC created an appropriate check and balance.

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### 4. Article 141 (Binding Precedent) & Article 142 (Complete Justice) vs Separation of Powers

#### A. Article 141 and Precedential Architecture

Under Article 141, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India:

- **Ratio Decidendi:** Operates as general legislative-equivalent law until modified by Parliament (*Union of India v. Raghubir Singh*, 1989).

- **Limits on Judicial Law-Making:** While the Court can fill legislative vacuums to enforce fundamental rights (*Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan*, 1997; *D.K. Basu v. State of W.B.*, 1997), it cannot enact statutory codes or tax provisions under the guise of interpretation.

#### B. Article 142 and the Quest for "Complete Justice"

Article 142(1) confers plenary power to pass any order necessary to do "complete justice".

- **Dynamic Uses:** Invoked to dissolve irretrievably broken marriages (*Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan*, 2023), transfer sensitive investigations to CBI (*Pooja Pal v. Union of India*, 2016), and monitor environmental cleanups (*M.C. Mehta*).

- **Constitutional Check (*Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India*, 1998):** The Court clarified that Article 142 is a corrective, supplemental power. It **cannot contravene express statutory prohibitions** or displace positive substantive law.

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### 5. Comparative Jurisprudence: The Appointment Paradigm

- **United States:** Executive nomination by the President subject to advice and consent (confirmation hearing and simple majority vote) of the Senate (Article II, Section 2, US Constitution). Entirely political/executive-legislative mechanism.

- **United Kingdom:** Independent Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) established under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, preserving transparency while excluding direct political interference.

- **India:** Unique global exception where the judiciary exercises primary control over its own appointments through the self-evolved Collegium mechanism, validated through basic structure jurisprudence.

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### 6. Conclusion & The Way Forward

The evolution of the higher judiciary from *S.P. Gupta* to the *NJAC Case* demonstrates the Indian Supreme Court's relentless defense of judicial independence against executive dominance. However, independence must be harmonized with transparency. As conceded in the post-NJAC proceedings, reforms in the **Memorandum of Procedure (MoP)**—mandating objective eligibility criteria, disclosure of reasons for non-appointment, and institutional diversity—are essential to ensure that the Collegium system commands unassailable democratic legitimacy while preserving the pristine sanctity of the basic structure.

Bare Act pointers

  • Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — sections 104–106, 109 and 63 where applicable
  • Art 124 — Supreme Court establishment & appointment
  • Art 129 — Court of Record & Contempt power
  • Art 131 — Original jurisdiction in federal disputes
  • Art 136 — Special leave to appeal
  • Art 141 — Law declared by Supreme Court binding on all courts
  • Art 142 — Inherent power to do complete justice
  • Art 143 — Advisory jurisdiction on Presidential reference
  • Art 214–217 — High Courts, establishment & appointment
  • Art 226 — High Court writ jurisdiction (FRs and any other purpose)
  • Art 227 — High Court judicial & administrative superintendence

Judgments on this provision